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Abstract 
Using modern portfolio theory, the traditional asset allocation process employs measurements of risk and 
return delivered by asset classes –for example, stocks, bonds and real estate - to build efficient portfolios.  
To build efficient portfolios in practice using this type of analysis requires that the risk and return 
characteristics of the asset class can be replicated in real portfolios.  This may be true of stocks and 
bonds, but is it true of real estate? 
 
Using new analysis coupled with previous UK-based research based on the uniquely rich MSCI (IPD) 
dataset for UK direct real estate, this paper compares the risk and return characteristics of real estate 
investment approaches (direct exposure, balanced and specialist unlisted funds, a multi-manager approach 
and listed securities) relative to a UK market index. Based on a random stochastic simulation of historic 
performance data from 2003 to 2012, we conclude that the difficulty of diversifying away specific risk in 
such a lumpy asset class means that it is extremely difficult and/or costly to access or replicate direct 
property market returns. This suggests that an investor/manager setting out to deliver returns in line with 
a market index would have to demonstrate significant levels of skill.  While listed real estate, which is 
more readily multi-manager strategies were able to deliver returns that more effectively replicated a direct 
benchmark. However, multi-manager fees negatively impacted on net returns. Specific risk can be avoided 
by real estate investors, but at a cost. 
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Abstract 
Using modern portfolio theory, the traditional asset allocation process employs measurements of risk and 
return delivered by asset classes –for example, stocks, bonds and real estate - to build efficient portfolios.  
To build efficient portfolios in practice using this type of analysis requires that the risk and return 
characteristics of the asset class can be replicated in real portfolios.  This may be true of stocks and bonds, 
but is it true of real estate? 
 
Using new analysis coupled with previous UK-based research based on the uniquely rich MSCI (IPD) 
dataset for UK direct real estate, this paper compares the risk and return characteristics of real estate 
investment approaches (direct exposure, balanced and specialist unlisted funds, a multi-manager approach 
and listed securities) relative to a UK market index. Based on a random stochastic simulation of historic 
performance data from 2003 to 2012, we draw several conclusions. 
 
Firstly, the difficulty of diversifying away specific risk in such a lumpy asset class means that it is extremely 
difficult and/or costly to access or replicate direct property market returns. This suggests that an 
investor/manager setting out to deliver returns in line with a market index would have to demonstrate 
significant levels of skill.  Secondly, listed real estate, which is more readily diversifiable, fails to deliver 
returns that are correlated with direct real estate in the short term (one to five years).  In contrast, it is clear 
that multi-manager strategies were able to deliver returns that more effectively replicated a direct 
benchmark.  
 
However, multi-manager fees negatively impacted on returns and largely accounted for average under-
performance of 0.15% against the direct benchmark. While it is estimated that over a 10 year analysis period 
both direct and listed investment strategies out-performed multi-manager strategies (by 121 bps and 59bps 
per annum respectively), this out-performance would have been delivered at the cost of significant tracking 
error against direct property benchmarks. Specific risk can be avoided by real estate investors, but at a cost. 
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1.  Introduction  
 
Using new analysis coupled with previous UK-based research based on the uniquely rich MSCI (IPD) 
dataset for UK direct real estate, this paper compares the risk and return characteristics of real estate 
investment approaches (direct exposure, balanced and specialist unlisted funds, a multi-manager approach 
and listed securities) relative to a UK market index. Based on a random stochastic simulation of historic 
performance data from 2003 to 2012, we will test a series of hypotheses about the risk and return 
characteristics of multi manager and fund of fund solutions. 
 
Using modern portfolio theory (MPT), the traditional asset allocation process employs measurements of 
risk and return delivered by asset classes - stocks, bonds, real estate - to build efficient portfolios.  MPT 
reflects the desire of investors to achieve higher returns, low individual asset risk and (more importantly) a 
smooth return on the entire portfolio. Asset allocation advice has, since the acceptance of MPT, 
traditionally required a view on three values: the likely future return on an asset class; its risk (usually defined 
as volatility and measured in units of standard deviation of return over a given period); and its correlation 
with other asset classes.  This last factor measures the extent to which upward and downward movements 
in the values of two variables are linked together.   
 
MPT has both led to, and has been further encouraged by, the development of asset allocation models.  
Strong prospective returns, coupled with low standard deviation of returns and a low correlation with 
equities and government bonds, would provide a very strong argument for holding an asset. When assets 
are combined in a portfolio, the expected return of a portfolio is the weighted average of the expected 
returns of the component assets. However, unless the assets are perfectly correlated the portfolio risk is 
not the weighted average: it is determined by the correlations of the component assets.  The way in which 
asset returns co-vary is central to portfolio risk, as low covariance produces diversification opportunities. 
 
MSCI/IPD’s UK annual index provides the longest available run of consistent annual data describing the 
performance of a well-diversified portfolio of real properties.  The results show the following: 
 
 Property returns have been below the return on equities but competitive with the return on 
government bonds. 
 
 Property volatility has been less than the volatility of equities and comparable to that of government 
bonds.  
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 Property returns have been less well correlated with returns on equities and government bonds 
than returns on equities and government bonds have been correlated with each other. In other 
words, while equities and government bonds have usually performed well or badly at the same 
time, property has outperformed or underperformed at different times, thus smoothing out the 
overall performance of a portfolio with assets of all three classes.  
 
To build efficient portfolios in practice using this type of analysis requires that the risk and return 
characteristics of the asset class can be replicated in real portfolios.  This may be true of stocks and bonds, 
but is it true of real estate? 
 
Commercial real estate is a large part of the universe of potential investments presented to global investors. 
As PREA (2013) suggests, it is very difficult to measure the size of the market exactly; but a report from 
the US-based Prudential, 2012, estimates the size of the global institutional-grade commercial real estate 
market as being over $26 trillion. (Other updated estimates put this figure at $32 trillion, according to Baum, 
2015.) For comparison, the end-of-2012 total market capitalization of publicly traded equities was $55 
trillion (World Bank, 2015).  If we had no view of its likely risk or return attributes, its size as an asset class 
suggests that commercial real estate should be seriously considered as a significant part of any investor’s 
portfolio, say around 50% of the typical equities allocation, which (in the UK, for example) has varied 
between 40% and 80% of all assets over time (NAPF, 2013). 
 
Within this $32 trillion, the listed universe (the gross asset value of property owned by REITs and listed 
property companies) comprised around $4.4 trillion or 14% of the investable universe at 2015, and the 
global unlisted property market universe, valued in 2015 at around $2.8 trillion, was estimated to comprise 
around9% of all global investable property (Baum, 2015).  
 
The development of indexes and benchmarks which measure the performance of real estate has been an 
extremely helpful contribution to our understanding of the risk and return characteristics of this asset class. 
The NCREIF Property Index in the USA and the work of IPD/MSCI in several countries allows asset 
allocators to form risk and return expectations founded on data, albeit flawed data.  While ‘valuation 
smoothing’, which reduces apparent price volatility and distorts the reported returns, produces a limitation 
on the value of this information - see, for example, Barkham and Geltner (1994) - investors continue to use 
this data as the basis of asset allocation modelling. However, we and others observe two further limitations 
to the usefulness of this data. 
 
First, an issue which is directly connected with valuation smoothing is the illiquidity of real estate, which 
creates difficulties for investors/asset allocators struggling with the challenges involved in mixing traded 
securities with privately traded assets.  Listed equity real estate – shares in real estate investment trusts 
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(REITs) and non-REIT property companies – become attractive in this context.  However, the 
performance of listed real estate stocks is believed to have characteristics that differ from that of direct, 
illiquid real estate.  Research and analysis suggests that real estate stocks are much more volatile than 
(smoothed) private real estate, that real estate stock prices might lead the price of private real estate with a 
lag of 6-12 months, and that there is little or no correlation between the returns on public and private equity 
real estate over rolling periods of up to (say) five years. Thereafter, over periods of more than five years, 
public and private real estate might behave more similarly.  These issues have been well documented by 
Clayton and MacKinnon (2003), Pagliari, Scherer and Monopoli (2003); Hoesli and Oikarinen (2012) and 
others (see Section 2).  We can expect that the tracking error of listed real estate portfolios against a direct 
benchmark will be very large. 
 
Second, it is widely accepted that portfolios comprising private real estate will likely contain significant 
specific risk. Real estate is said to be a ‘lumpy’ asset, with large and non-standard lot sizes.  The sampling 
that takes place in the assembly of a private real estate portfolio is largely without replacement, because one 
asset cannot generally be shared between two owners (which is not true of divisible listed securities).  These 
characteristics, when taken together, mean that a typical real estate portfolio will not be large enough to be 
well-diversified and will exhibit a significant tracking error against an index or universe of private real estate.  
This issue has been explored most in the UK context by, among others, Morrell (1993); Lee and Byrne 
(2001); Baum and Struempell (2005); and Devaney, Callendar, Sheahan and Key (2007).Hence, we can 
expect that the tracking error of direct real estate portfolios against a direct benchmark will be significant 
and will vary inversely with portfolio size. 
 
These limitations on the usefulness of private real estate universe data provide significant challenges to 
investors.  The universe data describes performance characteristics for the asset class that, according to the 
literature referred to above, cannot be captured by investors in direct real estate (because of the specific 
risk they take on) or by investors in real estate equity securities (because of the short to medium term 
divergence in returns between public and private real estate markets).   
 
Recently, a new form of access to real estate has become possible through the growth of the unlisted real 
estate fund.  Baum and Struempell (2006) found that over £1bn is needed to build a diversified portfolio 
of London offices with a 2% tracking error.   This presents a very strong case for using an unlisted fund 
focussed on London offices.  Assuming that such a fund is financed by equity alone, 20 investors 
committing £50m each will produce enough capital to achieve the diversified fund.  Yet the investor’s 
£50m is enough to buy only two or three London offices of average lot size. 
 
Kennedy and Baum (2011) suggested that some unlisted funds – including highly leveraged value-add or 
opportunity funds and funds focussed on debt - are likely to be sufficiently non-correlated with direct 
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property indexes as to cause significant difficulties for asset allocators.  We use the term core funds to describe 
unlisted real estate funds which do not invest in debt and are not value-add/opportunity funds.  Bearing 
this limitation in mind, we can suggest that core unlisted funds will diversify away much of the specific risk 
held by direct portfolios.  
 
The development of the unlisted fund has expanded the apparently investable real estate universe, and with 
it has come the multi-manager proposition (a separate account portfolio by means of which an investor’s 
capital  is spread across a number of unlisted real estate funds) and funds or funds (a similar proposition, 
but in a fund format and thereby pooled between a number of investors), with the result that professional 
investors now select from a variety of routes to exposure (see, for example, Andonov, Kok and Eicholtz, 
2013; Baum and Hartzell, (2011); and Baum (2015).   In this research, therefore, we set out to examine a 
set of approaches to real estate exposure suggested by, among others, Baum and Hartzell (2011).  These 
are: investing directly in real estate assets; investing in REITs and listed property companies; investing 
directly in core unlisted funds; and investing indirectly in core unlisted funds using a multi-manager 
approach.   
 
This paper employs a random stochastic simulation of historic performance data from 2003 to 2012 in 
order to test a series of hypotheses about the risk and return characteristics of multi manager and fund of 
fund solutions. Using these results we compare the risk and return characteristics of real estate investment 
approaches (direct exposure, balanced and specialist unlisted funds, a multi-manager approach and listed 
securities) relative to a UK market index.  
 
2. Relevant literature 
Valuation smoothing, illiquidity and lumpiness are referred to in Section 1 as the three major problems 
facing real estate investors who seek to access the return characteristics of private real estate as described 
by the accepted MSCI and NCREIF benchmarks. Over the last ten years, considerable attention has been 
paid to these problems in academic literature, and this literature helps us to further develop our hypotheses. 
 
2.1 Direct real estate  
We can hypothesise that direct real estate portfolios are likely to contain significant specific risk and that 
increasing the number of assets held in a portfolio will produce lower levels of risk. Research into the 
relationship between portfolio size and risk in the UK market was conducted by both Baum and Struempell 
(2006) and Callender et al (2007).   Baum and Struempell (2006), using individual asset time-weighted returns 
data from the IPD UK database, employed longitudinal analysis between 1990 and 2004 for the different 
property segments as defined by IPD. Their results showed that shopping centre portfolios required the 
smallest number of assets (11 individual assets) to reduce within-segment tracking error against the IPD 
universe to 2%, with the central London office segment requiring 80 assets, the highest number for any 
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market segment. Accounting for average segment lot sizes the retail warehouse and central London office 
sectors required the largest capital outlays of £1.0 billion and £1.2billion respectively to construct portfolios 
with a 2% tracking error.  
 
Callender et al (2007) conducted a similar analysis but also applied cross-section analysis in addition to a 
longitudinal analysis. The cross-section study was conducted between 1981 and 2004 with the sample size 
ranging from 11,000 assets in 2004 to 15,000 in earlier years. The longitudinal analysis was conducted 
between 1994 and 2004, and comprised a sample of 1,728 assets. This research applied simulation analysis 
and constructed hypothetical portfolios using individual asset returns. The authors found that cross-section 
return dispersion (the standard deviation of annual total returns) declined as the number of assets held in a 
portfolio increased with a 10 asset portfolio reducing individual asset dispersion risk by 65-75% and 100 
assets reducing this further to 85-90%. The longitudinal analysis found the correlation between individual 
assets to be very low at 0.18, although there was wide variation around this. The average asset correlation 
with the IPD All Property Index was found to be 0.41, but this value increased only marginally when 
individual assets were compared to their respective market segment performance indices.  This is consistent 
with the findings of Devaney and Lizieri (2005), who found that market segmentation had weak explanatory 
power in determining asset returns. Callender et al (2007) found that only 13 assets were required to reduce 
property risk by 80% and only 30 were need to reduce this further to 90%. However, the authors found 
that much larger portfolios were required to track the market with an investor who wants to reduce tracking 
error to 2% requiring approximately 60 assets, and a 1% tracking error target requiring in excess of 250 
assets. 
 
A recent study by Mitchell (2015) conducted a follow up study to the work published by Callender et al 
(2007)using data covering the period from 2002-2013, and found that the volatility of returns had increased 
significantly when compared with the 1994-2004 time period with an average standard deviation for a 
portfolio of 50 assets of 12.7% compared to the 4.7% reported by Callender. One significant difference 
between the two studies is that portfolio risk through the 2002-2013 time period was more associated with 
market rather than asset level risk and as a consequence an investor would have required fewer assets than 
implied in Callender to achieve a similar level of total risk present in the benchmark returns. The Mitchell 
study reported similar results to Callender with tracking errorsof 3.7% compared to 4.1%in a 10 asset 
portfolio, and 1.7% in comparison to 2.1% for a portfolio of 50 assets. Mitchell (2015) concluded that it 
was not clear whether the small reductions in estimated tracking errors were the result of differences in 
methodology or a fundamental change in property market characteristics.  
 
A study using US market data by Fisher and Goetzman (2005) adopted a different approach by using 
property cashflow data for assets acquired and disposed between 1977 and 2004, thereby removing the 
impact of valuation smoothing on returns. The use of cashflow data also meant that the authors could 
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analyse internal rates of returns rather than time-weighted rates of return. They also used a simulation 
analysis to construct random portfolios and found that portfolios with greater numbers of assets exhibited 
lower levels of volatility.  
 
Research into the direct market provides clear evidence that by increasing the number of assets held in a 
portfolio an investor will experience lower levels of risk. To achieve lower levels of risk requires significant 
amounts of capital that is available to only the largest investors with a reduction in tracking error proving 
to be particularly capital intensive.  
 
2.2 REITs 
We can hypothesise that long-run REIT market performance is likely to be more closely related to the 
direct real estate market than to the general stock market. Hoesli and Oikarinen (2012)follow the findings 
of studies by Pagliari et al (2005) and Ling and Naranjo (2014) in which returns were adjusted for the impact 
of appraisal smoothing, leverage and differences in sector composition, and no notable difference was 
found between the return means and variances of the NCREIF and NAREIT indices between 1993 and 
2001.Consequently, REITs and direct real estate should be relatively good substitutes in a long-horizon 
investment portfolio. However, we can also suggest that the short term returns on REITs are not highly 
positively correlated with short terms returns on direct real estate; this is well documented by, among others, 
Baum and Hartzell(2012). Given that REITs are securities traded on major stock exchanges, the short term 
volatility of these markets imposes itself on short term REIT returns, creating a divergence away from the 
influence of pure property market performance. 
 
2.3 Unlisted funds 
We know less about the performance of unlisted funds and (especially) portfolios of unlisted funds, 
although research into the cost and returns of different investment strategies was conducted by Andonov 
et al (2012).  This research analysed the real estate returns of 844 pension funds domiciled in US, Canada, 
Europe, Australia and New Zealand over a 20 year period (1990-2009). The authors found that larger 
pension funds are more likely to invest via an internal management team and this approach was associated 
with lower costs and higher gross performance than investing via external managers. Smaller pension funds 
were more likely to invest through funds of funds and this typically meant significantly higher fees and 
significant under-performance against an investor specific benchmark on both a gross and net of fee basis. 
For instance, US pension funds investing via a fund of funds approach under-performed on a net of fee 
basis compared to the benchmark by 3.76% compared to an under-performance of 1.29% when investing 
via external fund managers (whereby the investor decided in which funds to invest). The authors also noted 
that listed real estate investment strategies had the lowest average cost of 41bps compared to the fund-of-
funds strategy (highest) where the average cost was 182bps. The authors also reported some evidence that 
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the listed strategy had out-performed the investor-specific benchmark on a gross of fee basis although out-
performance at the net of fee level was statistically insignificant. 
 
This research and the consequent findings are somewhat flawed. The authors suggested that smaller 
investors would be better investing in real estate through REITs rather than via external direct fund 
managers, and in particular funds of funds. However, the research does not attempt to quantify the relative 
risks of these investment strategies and the extent to which the delivered returns reflect the performance 
of the underlying direct real estate market. The fund of funds sample is also limited to the experience of a 
small number of US pension funds investing via this strategy, and it perfectly possible that the performance 
of a statistically insignificant and under-performing number of funds of funds has been multiplied in 
importance by the sampling method used (one pension fund investing in a fund of funds is reported as one 
performance result; another pension fund investing in what could be the same fund of funds is reported as 
a second result; and so on).  
 
2.4 Mutual funds and funds of funds 
Being reasonably modern creations, published research examining the performance of real estate funds of 
funds is hard to come by Andonov et al (2012), referred to above, is a rare example. To find any indication 
of the likely performance of property vehicles which pool funds together, we need to look more widely.  
 
Mutual fund research provides a starting place. While REITs are not funds, they are investment vehicles, 
and we might expect the performance of REIT mutual funds to provide something of a guide to the risk 
characteristics of funds of other property funds. There have been numerous studies into the performance 
of US REIT mutual funds: these have provided mixed results as to whether managers have been able to 
demonstrate skill and out-perform benchmarks. As an example, Chiang et al (2008) compared the returns 
of REIT mutual returns against randomly-selected REIT portfolios and found that only 12 out of the 54 
mutual funds studied delivered returns superior to the 95th percentile of returns generated by randomly-
constructed REIT portfolios.  This, like Andonov et al, is not encouraging.  
 
Private equity funds of funds are another close analogy to a real estate fund of funds. Weidig et al (2005) 
examined the potential performance of private equity funds of funds by constructing random portfolios of 
venture capital funds covering the period 1983-2004. The authors found that distributions of fund-of-fund 
returns were less skewed and had thinner tails than the distribution of individual fund returns. The risk as 
measured by the standard deviation of returns was also lower for the fund of funds investment strategy, 
with the standard deviation for the US sample falling from 54.47% for single funds to 5.53% for the fund 
of funds approach. The study also found that the level of idiosyncratic risk reduced as the number of funds 
held in the portfolio increased. These findings are more in line with expectations.   
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However, other than the study by Andonov et al (2012) very little reported research has been conducted 
into the performance of multi-manager/fund-of-fund strategies invested specifically in unlisted real estate 
funds. Hence we believe that more detailed analysis on the risk and return characteristics of unlisted real 
estate funds, and especially portfolios of unlisted real estate funds, is required.  
 
3. Hypotheses and data 
Previous work has established that for investors wishing to replicate the risk and return characteristics of 
real estate as described by the standard index measure, direct real estate ownership suffers a problem, 
namely the difficulty of diversifying away specific risk.  More easily diversified listed real estate suffers a 
different problem, namely a very large tracking error against the market index. 
 
Since the early 2000s it has been possible to use unlisted funds - or a portfolio of core unlisted funds - to 
invest in real estate.  Investing in a single fund has the advantage of simplicity, and if the choice of fund is 
random there is no cost involved in selection.  This approach has a disadvantage, specifically the risk 
involved in choosing the wrong (low return or high risk) fund. Investing in a portfolio of funds, on the 
other hand, reduces this risk but may have a fee implication if a portfolio manager is employed to assemble 
and manage this exposure. We call this a multi-manager approach.   
 
The research questions which arise are as follows: (i) do unlisted funds diversify away specific real estate 
risk? and(ii) are there any risk and return costs involved in this approach?  Given the foregoing literature 
review, we can expect that the greater the number of funds held in a portfolio the lower will be the tracking 
error against a direct property benchmark, and that returns will fall as two sets of fees are incurred by 
investors following a multi-manager strategy. 
 
3.1 Hypotheses 
Through this review, we have arrived at a set of hypotheses, as follows. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Core unlisted funds will diversify away much of the specific risk held by direct portfolios.  
 
Hypothesis 2: The greater the number of funds held in a portfolio the lower will be the tracking error 
against a direct property benchmark. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Returns will fall as two sets of fees are incurred by investors following a multi-manager 
strategy. 
 
In Sections 4 and 5 we will describe a series of tests which we use to test these hypotheses. Each test will 
involve random sampling of returns in a controlled experiment.  The particular aim of the research is 
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measure the performance that might reasonably be expected from a randomised multi-manager solution 
relative to randomised investment in (a) direct real estate; (b) a single co-mingled fund; and (c) a separate 
REIT account.  
 
3.2 Data  
The analysis and tests which we propose to present in the following sections require good quality data and 
research results describing direct real estate returns; direct real estate specific risk; listed real estate returns; 
and returns for core unlisted real estate funds. There are very few markets for which this data is available, 
including the US, the UK and perhaps Australia.  There is also a very limited time period for which this 
data is available, beginning around the year 2000.  Only in the UK has direct real estate data been used to 
measure specific risk characteristics of portfolios, as at 2013; and in the UK we also have access to data 
over the period 2002-2012 covering direct real estate returns; direct real estate specific risk; listed real estate 
returns; and returns for core unlisted real estate funds. Hence we have used UK data for this period as our 
example of a global real estate market. 
 
In this analysis we use historic returns delivered by UK funds and typical multi-manager fees as summarised 
in Tables 1-3; apply random fund selection; and suggest the level of return and risk likely to have been 
delivered by these strategies relative to an IPD benchmark. Fund returns are provided by The Association 
of Real Estate Funds (AREF). We use two AREF fund universes: the constituents of the AREF/IPD all-
balanced UK property fund index (26 funds) and the AREF/IPD all-pooled UK property fund index (44 
funds, including the 26 in the all-balanced universe). The former is focussed on diversified open-ended 
funds; the latter is a broader measure, including balanced funds and so-called specialist funds which are 
sector-specific and more likely to be leveraged, to be closed-ended and of limited life.  We also compare 
these results with the levels of return and risk likely to have been delivered by a single fund, 
randomly selected; by two funds, randomly selected (the dual fund approach); by a portfolio of 
randomly selected direct real estate assets; and by a typical REIT manager. 
 
Table 1: Purchase cost assumptions 
Strategy Initial Purchase Costs Source 
Direct 5% CBRE GIP 
Single Fund 5% CBRE GIP 
Dual Fund 5% CBRE GIP 
Multi-manager 5% CBRE GIP 
Listed 0.12% Consillia Capital 
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Table 2: Management fee assumptions 
Strategy Annual Management Fee Source 
Direct 0.5% of NAV CBRE GIP 
Single Fund Fund specific (no adjustment made) n/a 
Dual Fund Fund specific (no adjustment made) n/a 
Multi-manager 0.25% NAV CBRE GIP/PFR 
Listed 0.50% Consillia Capital 
 
Table 3: Portfolio balancing fee assumptions 
Strategy Portfolio rebalancing fee Source 
Direct n/a  
Single Fund n/a  
Dual Fund n/a  
Multi-manager n/a  
Listed 0.12% Consillia Capital 
 
The analysis uses the AREF database of returns on pooled property funds from 2003 to 2012 to 
assemble random multi-fund portfolios (see Table 4).  (The AREF fund level returns are only available 
at a net of fees level, so it is not possible to produce gross of fee comparisons across all of the strategies. 
The fund return data is calculated on an NAV basis only, so we cannot isolate the impact of leverage. This 
is also true of the listed REIT data.) 
 
Table 4: Funds and simulation runs, multi-manager strategies 
Multi-manager strategy Number of funds in portfolio Number of simulation runs 
£25m 10 5,000 
£50m 15 5,000 
£100m 20 5,000 
 
 
4. Method 
The analysis is founded upon a controlled experiment rather than an empirical study. The results are 
therefore normative - demonstrating what ought to happen - rather than positive - demonstrating what did 
happen.  The nature of a controlled experiment means that many precise limiting assumptions have to be 
made. While we have calibrated these limiting assumptions with the practice of a leading multi-manager 
they remain assumptions and there can be no guarantee that the real world will mimic the experiment.   
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4.1 Invested capital 
We assume separate account mandates of (i) £25m, (ii) £50m and (iii) £100m across all real estate 
investment types. For the multi-manager portfolio we assume a typical average exposure to each fund, 
thereby producing a target number of funds invested.  The multi-manager portfolio is standardised with 10 
funds in a £25m portfolio, 15 in a £50m portfolio and 20 funds in a £100m portfolio. This has been 
calibrated by reference to the average number of funds in typical multi-manager portfolios of these sizes. 
 
4.2 Investment universe 
The dataset we use for direct property is the IPD UK All Property Index. The dataset we use for property 
funds is the all-pooled UK property fund index (the balanced universe plus specialist funds) as at January 
2003. We run this universe on a random basis, sampling from both the more restricted balanced fund 
universe and the broader pooled fund index. The investment universe for listed investments in the 
EPRA/NAREIT UK Index.  
 
4.3 Benchmark 
In all tests, the benchmarks used will be the annual total return of the IPD UK All Property Index to act 
as a proxy for direct market returns. 
 
4.4 The multi-manager investment strategy 
Portfolio simulation process 
Stage 1: We use random (without replacement) fund selection to simulate a large (5,000) number of multi-
fund portfolios. For each simulated multi-manager portfolio every underlying fund has an equal probability 
of selection and has equal weight at the beginning of the analysis period, so that in the £25m portfolio each 
fund is allocated an initial investment of £2.5m in the first year. No trading is assumed during the analysis 
period. 
 
Stage 2: For each of the simulation runs we compute the mean 10 year returns relative to the benchmark, 
and the tracking error for each portfolio.  We then average these results across the entire sample. 
 
Stage 3:  As we randomly select funds without replacement (so that no fund can be selected more than once 
in each portfolio) statistical inference might be compromised.  We employ bootstrap re-sampling to mitigate 
this by providing confidence intervals for the average we calculated from the simulations. To calculate 
confidence intervals for the point estimates calculated in stage 2 we employ a bootstrap re-sampling 
methodology whereby a further 1,000 re-samples of 5,000 observations are created by selecting random 
(with replacement) observations of the statistic of interest from the sample of portfolios calculated in stage 
1. This will provide a distribution of re-sampled means from which 95% and 99% confidence intervals can 
13  
be calculated. For instance, the 97.5% and 2.5% percentiles will act as the upper and lower bounds for the 
95% confidence level. 
 
Simulation model: parameters and return calculation methodology  
Fees 
Multi-manager fees are defined as 0.25% of net asset value (NAV) and are deducted annually using the 
NAV at the start of each respective year and deducted from income return. Fee levels are assumed to be 
uniform across mandate size and strategy. The cost of entering a fund is defined as 5%, so that a £100m 
investment will cost £105m, with £105m set as the starting value of the investment. This reflects a typical 
entry price spread. We deduct typical or industry average fees from returns in each case. Funds and 
properties are acquired using a standard acquisition spread of 5% and are held to the end of time period 
without a sale fee or spread. No adjustments are made to the spread to take account of fund gearing, as it 
is assumed that fees will be partially capitalised and fund NAVs will reflect this distortion. 
 
Closed end funds 
All capital is drawn down at the same time for each fund regardless of the fund being open-ended or closed 
ended. For open-ended funds this is not an issue, but with closed-ended funds it is assumed that the 
investment is made at a ‘second close’ at the end of the launch year. This will eliminate the impact of a cash 
drag from the portfolio. 
 
Annual total return calculations 
The fund of funds’ year end NAV is the sum of the year end NAV of constituent investments. Each 
constituent NAV is calculated by adjusting the NAV by reference to the reported annual capital returns for 
each underlying fund. Income return is calculated by reference to the reported annual income return and is 
not reinvested in the fund. Fees are deducted from the income portion of the return. 
 
Survivor bias 
We avoid survivor bias by following the funds initially selected through their lifetime.  If a fund merges 
with or is taken over by another, the performance of the successor fund is used.  If the fund fails, we assume 
a receipt of capital, in line with what happened, and there is no investment in a replacement fund at that 
point.  
 
Single/dual fund strategy 
For the single fund approach we simply average the relative returns and tracking errors of each fund in the 
universe. For the dual fund approach we assume 50% weights to two randomly selected funds, and compute 
relative returns and tracking errors of each pair. Annual total returns are calculated using the same method 
as detailed in the multi-manager strategy specification with no re-investment of income.   
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4.5 Direct property 
For the direct portfolio, we will use tracking errors reported for different portfolio sizes in the Callenderet 
al (2007) report. These results are broadly similar to those found by Mitchell (2015).  For each mandate the 
number of assets that can be acquired by the £25m, £50m, or £100m mandate is calculated by using the 
average lot size of assets of the IPD index (i.e. the capital value of the index divided by the total number of 
properties). The total number of assets is then used to determine the respective tracking error as reported 
in previous research. 
 
Fees 
We deduct an annual management fee of 0.5% of asset value and a 5% transaction fee on acquisition.    
 
Annual total return calculation 
The average capital value of assets in the IPD index is used as the entry price for investors. This value is 
then increased (or decreased) by the capital return reported by the IPD All Property Index to calculate the 
year end capital value. The annual income return reported by IPD is used to calculate the income received 
for that year and is not reinvested in the mandate. Management fees are deducted from the income.  
 
4.6 REITs  
For REITs, we use the annual total returns on the EPRA/NAREIT UK REIT index and apply an 
appropriate management and acquisition fee. For the EPRA UK tracking investment we deduct an annual 
management fee of 0.5% and an annual transaction fee of 0.12% to rebalance the portfolio weightings to 
replicate the index. The fund is an accumulation fund that reinvests dividends and tracks the EPRA UK 
REIT index.   
 
5.  Analysis and Results  
 
5.1 Summary results 
This section provides the headline results from the analysis. These results are summarised in Table 5, which 
presents the mean 10 year time-weighted rate of return (TWRR), 10 year excess returns and tracking errors 
over the 2003-2012 analysis. 
 
Table 5 presents the time weighted rate of return, the excess return relative to the tracking error relative to 
the IPD all-property index and the tracking error relative to the IPD all-property index of a series of 
strategies providing real estate exposure.  These strategies include direct property acquisitions; single, dual 
and multi fund strategies derived from the all-balanced AREF universe and the all-pooled AREF universe; 
and a portfolio of REITs.  For the direct and multi-fund strategies we test exposures of £25m, £50m and 
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£100m, as tracking errors will vary with size (whereas the number of assets in the single fund, dual fund 
and REIT portfolios is  invariant as regards size).  
 
The table shows that the tracking error of direct real estate portfolios against a direct benchmark is 
significant and varies inversely with portfolio size. For this test, we simply use the estimated tracking errors 
found by Callendar et al (2007). Applying these estimates directly, we find that the tracking errors for 
portfolios of £25m, £50m and £200m are 7.59%, 5.35% and 4.06% respectively. For a £25m exposure, 
this means that returns will be up to 7.59% above or below the IPD universe return in two years put of 
three, and more dispersed one year in three.  We would say that these are indeed significant values: the 
average return on the IPD UK index since its inception has been around 10%, so tracking errors of 4.04% 
- 7.59% are large. 
 
Table 5 also shows that the tracking errors for listed portfolios are invariant as regards size of mandate, as 
these investments are divisible. However, the tracking error against the IPD benchmark is an enormous 
22.43% with formal t-tests showing that this figure is statistically different to the tracking errors recorded 
for direct and unlisted fund strategies (Table 6).  The balanced and pooled fund benchmarks under-
performed the direct benchmark by 2.06% and 2.27% respectively.  Fund management fees will partly 
explain this; a manager fee of between 0.5% and 1% of gross assets is typical, and this will reduce returns 
by a similar amount.  Another possible reason for this is the impact of volatile markets and cash flows into 
and out of the funds which comprise the benchmark, many of which are open-ended and may be forced to 
sell assets in weak markets and buy assets in strong markets. There is also some leverage in the benchmark, 
with more in the all-pooled fund benchmark due to specialist funds typically being more highly leveraged.  
As Alcock, Baum, Colley and Steiner (2014) showed, this was damaging to fund performance over this 
analysis period.   
 
The tracking error of the all-pooled index is also much greater than the tracking error of the all-balanced 
index as measured against the IPD direct benchmark. From this table it is also clear that no investment 
strategy either matched or delivered a superior return to the direct market index. The results suggest that 
investors would have been disappointed with the total return performance of each investment strategy 
compared to the average or time-weighted rate of return of the gross of fee direct market (6.31%) as 
measured by the (uninvestable) IPD benchmark. The level of under-performance ranges from 100bps for 
the average direct mandate up to 322bps for a single fund strategy not restricted to balanced funds. The 
highest average total return for multi-manager strategies was 4.11% for a £50m mandate that was invested 
purely in the balanced fund universe. An investment that tracked the EPRA/NAREIT UK REIT Total 
Return Index would have delivered returns of 4.69% p.a., which is marginally higher than the highest 
average return for unlisted fund strategies, but is still 162bps below the performance of the direct market 
benchmark.   
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Table 5: Real estate investment strategy risk/return comparison, 2003-2012 
Universe Strategy TWRR Excess return Tracking error 
Benchmarks 
IPD All Property Index 6.31 n/a n/a 
AREF Balanced Fund Index 4.25 -2.06 1.41 
AREF All-pooled Fund Index 4.04 -2.27 3.71 
Direct Mandate 
£25m 5.31 -1.00 7.59 
£50m 5.31 -1.00 5.35 
£100m 5.31 -1.00 4.06 
Unlisted Balanced Fund 
Universe 
Single Fund 4.27 -2.04 3.77 
Dual Fund 4.31 -2.00 3.07 
£25m multi-manager 4.09 -2.22 2.12 
£50m multi-manager 4.11 -2.20 2.01 
£100m multi-manager 4.10 -2.21 1.95 
Unlisted All-pooled Property 
Fund Universe 
Single Fund 3.09 -3.22 7.64 
Dual Fund 3.46 -2.85 6.04 
£25m multi-manager 3.50 -2.81 3.63 
£50m multi-manager 3.54 -3.17 3.33 
£100m multi-manager 3.51 -2.80 3.19 
Listed Mandate UK REITS 4.69 -1.62 22.43 
 
Source: IPF (2007), IPD, AREF, EPRA 
 Table 6: Test for equality of tracking error means (listed vs direct and unlisted fund strategies)  
Strategy  1 Strategy 2 
Strategy 1 Strategy 2 t-test* 
Mean Std. dev #obs Mean 
Std. 
dev #obs t-stat Prob. 
£25m direct Listed 7.59 3.23 20,000 23.43 0.00 1 -692.44 0.0000 
£50m direct Listed 5.35 1.94 20,000 23.43 0.00 1 -1315.43 0.0000 
£100m direct Listed 4.06 1.45 20,000 23.43 0.00 1 -1893.00 0.0000 
Single all-balanced fund Listed 3.77 2.39 22 23.43 0.00 1 -38.57 0.0000 
Single all-pooled fund Listed 7.64 6.61 43 23.43 0.00 1 -15.65 0.0000 
Dual all-balanced fund Listed 3.07 1.52 231 23.43 0.00 1 -203.61 0.0000 
Dual all-pooled fund Listed 6.04 3.69 903 23.43 0.00 1 -141.48 0.0000 
£25m all-balanced mm* Listed 2.12 0.22 5,000 23.43 0.00 1 -6725.25 0.0000 
£25m all-pooled mm Listed 3.63 3.51 5,000 23.43 0.00 1 -399.44 0.0000 
£50m all-balanced mm Listed 2.01 0.12 5,000 23.43 0.00 1 -12690.20 0.0000 
£50m all-pooled mm Listed 3.33 3.28 5,000 23.43 0.00 1 -432.90 0.0000 
£100m all-balanced mm Listed 1.95 0.05 5,000 23.43 0.00 1 -30066.55 0.0000 
£100m all-pooled mm Listed 3.19 3.16 5,000 23.43 0.00 1 -452.99 0.0000 
 Notes: * mm = multi-manager 1. Due to the listed fund strategy tracking the performance of the EPRA index, the variance of the listed portfolio is zero with an effective sample size of infinity. For these calculations the authors have used a sample size of 1. 2. *Satterthwaite-Welch 
However, despite the direct benchmark out-performing all other strategies, for a given amount invested 
(£25m, £50m or £100m) a direct market strategy would have delivered the widest range of returns for 
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investors.  For example, the tracking error of a £100m direct mandate would have averaged 4.06%, which 
compares to 3.19% or 1.95% for £100m multi-manager strategies derived from the pooled and balanced 
universes respectively and 3.77% for a single fund randomly selected from the all-balanced universe (but 
7.64% for a fund randomly selected from the all-pooled universe.) 
 
5.2 Hypotheses 
We set out to examine three hypotheses summarised in section 3, and now present the results of our analysis 
as it affects each hypothesis in turn. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Core unlisted funds will diversify away much of the specific risk held by direct portfolios. 
 
Table 5 shows that the random selection of a single fund from the all-balanced universe delivers a lower 
tracking error against a direct benchmark than does a direct portfolio of any size, even £100m. However, 
while the average tracking error for a single balanced fund was lower at 3.77% compared to 4.06% for a 
£100m direct mandate, an analysis of t-tests for equality of means results in the null hypothesis being 
rejected, indicating that there is insufficient evidence to say that the two means are different. Using the all-
pooled universe, the tracking error is 7.64% against 7.59% for a £25m direct mandate, again statistically 
indistinguishable (Table 6).The random selection of two funds from the all-balanced universe reduces the 
relative tracking error further. The tracking error is 3.07% against 4.06% for a £100m direct mandate; using 
the all-pooled universe produces a tracking error of 6.04% against 7.59% for a £25m direct mandate. This 
time the t-test results confirm that the means in both comparisons are statistically different.  
 
When the mandate follows a multi-manager strategy restricted to the all-balanced fund universe, tracking 
errors fall further. For a £25m exposure, the tracking error is 2.12% against 7.59% for a direct mandate; 
for a £50m exposure, 2.01% against 5.35%; for a £100m exposure, 1.95% against 4.06%.Again, formal 
statistical t-tests provide confirmation that the means for the respective samples are statistically different 
(Table 7).  
 
When the mandate follows a multi-manager strategy which can use the all-pooled fund universe, tracking 
errors are less impressive. For a £25m exposure, the tracking error is 3.63% against 7.59% for a direct 
mandate; for a £50m exposure, 3.33% against 5.35%; for a £100m exposure, 3.19% against 4.06%, all 
statistically different (Table 8). 
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Table 7: Test for equality of tracking error mean, all-balanced multi-manager vs direct   
Strategy  1 Strategy 2 Strategy 1 Strategy 2 Satterthwaite-Welch t-test Mean Std. dev #obs Mean Std. dev #obs t-stat Prob. 
Single fund Direct £25m 3.77 2.39 22 7.59 3.23 20,000 -7.4990 0.0032 
Single fund Direct £50m 3.77 2.39 22 5.35 1.94 20,000 -3.1041 0.0054 
Single fund Direct £100m 3.77 2.39 22 4.06 1.45 20,000 -0.5817 0.5670 
Dual fund Direct £25m 3.07 1.52 231 7.59 3.23 20,000 -44.0778 0.0000 
Dual fund Direct £50m 3.07 1.52 231 5.35 1.94 20,000 -22.5646 0.0000 
Dual fund Direct £100m 3.07 1.52 231 4.06 1.45 20,000 -9.8601 0.0000 
£25m multi-manager  Direct £25m 2.12 0.22 5000 7.59 3.23 20,000 -237.1091 0.0000 
£25m multi-manager Direct £50m 2.12 0.22 5000 5.35 1.94 20,000 -229.0781 0.0000 
£25m multi-manager Direct £100m 2.12 0.22 5000 4.06 1.45 20,000 -181.5997 0.0000 
£50m multi-manager  Direct £25m 2.01 0.12 5000 7.59 3.23 20,000 -243.4798 0.0000 
£50m multi-manager Direct £50m 2.01 0.12 5000 5.35 1.94 20,000 -241.2113 0.0000 
£50m multi-manager Direct £100m 2.01 0.12 5000 4.06 1.45 20,000 -198.0967 0.0000 
£100m multi-
manager Direct £25m 1.95 0.05 5000 7.59 3.23 20,000 -246.4638 0.0000 
£100m multi-
manager Direct £50m 1.95 0.05 5000 5.35 1.94 20,000 -246.7469 0.0000 
£100m multi-
manager 
Direct 
£100m 1.95 0.05 5000 4.06 1.45 20,000 -205.7215 0.0000 
 
 
Table 8: Test for equality of tracking error mean, all-pooled multi-manager vs direct   
Strategy  1 Strategy 2 Strategy 1 Strategy 2 Satterthwaite-Welch t-test Mean Std. dev #obs Mean Std. dev #obs t-stat Prob. 
Single fund Direct £25m 7.64 6.61 43 7.59 3.23 20,000 0.0484 0.9616 
Single fund Direct £50m 7.64 6.61 43 5.35 1.94 20,000 2.2727 0.0282 
Single fund Direct £100m 7.64 6.61 43 4.06 1.45 20,000 3.5481 0.0010 
Dual fund Direct £25m 6.04 3.69 903 7.59 3.23 20,000 -12.4239 0.0000 
Dual fund Direct £50m 6.04 3.69 903 5.35 1.94 20,000 5.5805 0.0000 
Dual fund Direct £100m 6.04 3.69 903 4.06 1.45 20,000 16.0245 0.0000 
£25m multi-manager Direct £25m 3.63 1.20 5,000 7.59 3.23 20,000 -139.1751 0.0000 
£25m multi-manager Direct £50m 3.63 1.20 5,000 5.35 1.94 20,000 -78.7988 0.0000 
£25m multi-manager Direct £100m 3.63 1.20 5,000 4.06 1.45 20,000 -22.0022 0.0000 
£50m multi-manager Direct £25m 3.33 0.90 5,000 7.59 3.23 20,000 -162.9711 0.0000 
£50m multi-manager Direct £50m 3.33 0.90 5,000 5.35 1.94 20,000 -107.9241 0.0000 
£50m multi-manager Direct £100m 3.33 0.90 5,000 4.06 1.45 20,000 -44.8881 0.0000 
£100m multi-manager Direct £25m 3.19 0.71 5,000 7.59 3.23 20,000 -176.3731 0.0000 
£100m multi-manager Direct £50m 3.19 0.71 5,000 5.35 1.94 20,000 -127.0103 0.0000 
£100m multi-manager Direct £100m 3.19 0.71 5,000 4.06 1.45 20,000 -61.0852 0.0000 
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Hypothesis 2: The greater the number of funds held in a portfolio the lower will be the tracking error 
against a direct property benchmark. 
 
Figures 1 and 2 show that for both all-balanced and all-pooled mandates the greater the number of funds 
held in a portfolio the lower is the tracking error against the direct property benchmark.  However, the 
reduction of risk as size increases is much less impressive for the all-pooled universe.  
 
Figure 1: Distribution polygons of direct tracking errors -all-balanced multi-manager mandates 
 
 
When comparing the risk of unlisted fund strategies only, our analysis indicates that the greater the number 
of individual funds held in a portfolio the lower the tracking error a hypothetical investor would have 
experienced. Using the all-balanced fund universe (Table 7) the average tracking error recorded for a single 
fund approach was 3.77%, with this value declining to 1.95% for a portfolio of 20 balanced funds. The 
reduction in tracking error achieved by adding one more fund also appears to have a diminishing marginal 
impact, with the 0.17% difference in absolute tracking errors between a £25m multi-manager strategy (five 
funds) and £100m multi-manager strategy (20 funds) being small compared to the 0.7% reduction achieved 
when adding a second balanced fund to a single fund strategy (Table 7).  However, Table 8 shows that these 
are not statistically different observations.  An analysis of the distribution of tracking errors for each strategy 
indicates that as the number of funds increases the range of possible tracking errors declines. Table 9 shows 
that, for instance, the highest tracking error recorded for the £25m all-balanced multi-manager strategy is 
2.9% compared to 2.4% for the £50m portfolio and 2.1% for a £100m portfolio. Therefore, while investing 
in a £100m portfolio would not, on average, produce a large reduction in the absolute tracking risk, the 
maximum downside tracking error would fall to a level below the mean tracking error of a £25m portfolio. 
However, and curiously, the £100m mandate produces a higher minimum tracking error of 1.83% 
compared to 1.50% for a £25m multi-manager mandate (Table 9).  This result may be driven by negative 
or low correlations between a small number of funds.  
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Figure 2: Distribution polygons of direct tracking errors - all-pooled multi-manager mandates
 
 
Investing randomly in the all-pooled fund universe would have produced similar results but at greater 
magnitudes for similar sized unlisted strategies, with portfolios with a higher number of funds recording 
the lowest tracking errors. The mean tracking error for the £25m mandate was 3.63% compared to 3.19% 
for the £100m mandate (Table 5). An investor increasing the number of funds in a portfolio would have 
also benefited from protection against higher tracking errors with a maximum tracking error of 8.37% for 
a £25m mandate compared to 5.83% for a £100m mandate, but this would again come at the cost of a 
higher minimum tracking error of 0.95%,compared to 1.14%.These minimum tracking errors are lower 
than for any of the all-balanced fund multi-manager mandates. Again, this result appears to be driven by 
negative correlations between certain funds.  
 
Table 9: Descriptive statistics for tracking errors of all-balanced unlisted strategies 
 
Single balanced 
fund 
Dual balanced 
funds 
All-balanced 
£25m 
All-balanced 
£50m 
All-balanced 
£100m 
Mean 3.765455 3.070996 2.117396 2.007803 1.952034 
Median 2.980000 2.630000 2.106275 2.006562 1.948528 
Maximum 13.42000 8.810000 2.896692 2.445913 2.102713 
Minimum 2.170000 1.260000 1.501037 1.644278 1.829628 
Std. Dev. 2.391054 1.519684 0.224085 0.119366 0.050512 
Skewness 3.187609 2.185994 0.258578 0.073813 0.176092 
Kurtosis 13.36750 7.100979 2.822549 2.776582 2.807637 
Jarque-Bera 135.7844 345.8485 62.27883 14.93938 33.54925 
Probability 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000570 0.000000 
Sum 82.84000 709.4000 10586.98 10039.02 9760.170 
Sum Sq. Dev. 120.0599 531.1709 251.0209 71.22745 12.75466 
Observations 22 231 5000 5000 5000 
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Table 10: Descriptive statistics for tracking errors of all-pooled unlisted strategies 
 
Single all-pooled 
fund 
Dual all-pooled 
funds All-pooled £25m All-pooled £50m All-pooled £100m 
Mean 7.640930 6.038660 3.625376 3.331180 3.186350 
Median 4.050000 5.640000 3.505900 3.282975 3.160000 
Maximum 25.20000 21.08000 8.373379 6.339588 5.830000 
Minimum 1.610000 0.840000 0.953037 1.017338 1.140000 
Std. Dev. 6.613932 3.693900 1.202455 0.895572 0.710011 
Skewness 1.262558 0.909791 0.504289 0.298285 0.232749 
Kurtosis 3.490179 3.481825 2.924664 2.750881 2.854653 
Jarque-Bera 11.85453 133.3066 213.1053 87.07406 49.54454 
Probability 0.002666 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 
Sum 328.5600 5452.910 18126.88 16655.90 15931.75 
Sum Sq. Dev. 1837.252 12307.70 7228.049 4009.442 2520.072 
 Observations 43 903 5000 5000 5000 
 
Table 11: Test for equality of tracking error means between all-balanced multi-manager mandates 
Strategy  1 Strategy 2 Strategy 1 Strategy 2 Satterthwaite-Welch t-test Mean Std. dev #obs Mean Std. dev #obs t-stat Prob. 
£25m £50m 2.12 0.22 5,000 2.01 0.22 5,000 30.52206 0.0000 
£25m £100m 2.12 0.22 5,000 1.95 0.05 5,000 50.90327 0.0000 
£50m £100m 2.01 0.12 5,000 1.95 0.05 5,000 30.42486 0.0000 
 
Table 12: Test for equality of tracking error means between all-pooled multi-manager mandates 
Strategy  1 Strategy 2 Strategy 1 Strategy 2 Satterthwaite-Welch t-test Mean Std. dev #obs Mean Std. dev #obs t-stat Prob. 
£25m £50m 3.63 1.20 5,000 3.33 0.90 5,000 13.87486 0.0000 
£25m £100m 3.63 1.20 5,000 3.19 0.71 5,000 22.23086 0.0000 
£50m £100m 3.33 0.90 5,000 0.71 0.71 5,000 8.960763 0.0000 
 
Hypothesis 3: Returns to investors following a multi-manager strategy will fall as two sets of fees are 
incurred. 
 
All fund-based returns are lower than the returns delivered by a direct portfolio (5.31%). However, it is not 
clear that the investor pays in full for the extra fees charged by a multi-manager. When selecting from the 
all-balanced universe, the multi-manager returns are only 20 basis points below the single and dual fund 
returns.  When selecting from the all-pooled universe, the multi-manager net of fee returns are on average 
slightly higher than the single and dual fund returns.  This suggests some downside skewness in the fund 
universes. Some very bad results in the fund universe over this period may appear not to have been 
compensated by equally extreme strong performers, while the diversification delivered by a multi-manager 
avoids this problem and effectively earns back some - or all - of the second layer of fees. 
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Evidence from the simulations indicates that multi-manager mandates provide investors with some 
protection against poor performance in individual funds, with the lowest return in the single all-balanced 
fund strategy of 1.22% rising to 3.93% for the £100m multi-manager mandate (Table 13). This trend is 
particularly evident in the all-pooled fund universe with the lowest single fund return being -10.46% 
compared to 1.59% for the £100m multi-manager mandate (Table 14). 
 
The descriptive statistics for the respective samples provide further evidence that as the number of funds 
included in a portfolio increases investors are protected against lower returns, with the distribution of 
returns for unlisted fund strategies progressing from a negative to a positive skew in the case of the all-
balanced universe (Table 13). In the all-balanced sample the level of skew recorded in the 10 year TWRR 
moves from negative at -0.73 for a single fund strategy to 0.36 for the £100m multi-manager mandate, 
meaning that investors are more likely to achieve a return above the mean than would otherwise be expected 
in a normal distribution. A similar trend is evident in the all-pooled fund universe with the observed level 
of skew in the distribution of returns progressing from -1.77 for the single fund sample to -0.10 for the 
£100m multi-manager mandate (Table 14). 
 
Evidence from this research suggest that increasing the number of funds held in a portfolio not only reduces 
the probability of an investor receiving a lower return but it also narrows the range of possible returns 
within each strategy providing greater levels of certainty for investors (Tables 13 and 14, Figures 3 and 4). 
 
Table 13: Descriptive statistics for all-balanced strategies, 10year time-weighted rates of return 
 Single Dual £25m £50m £100m 
 Mean 4.270000 4.308745 4.094582 4.105301 4.101095 
 Median 4.650000 4.420000 4.101504 4.106997 4.095549 
 Maximum 6.060000 6.010000 5.009347 4.687339 4.343495 
 Minimum 1.220000 1.460000 2.991351 3.541256 3.933806 
 Std. Dev. 1.358630 0.898079 0.295487 0.182345 0.083157 
 Skewness -0.728390 -0.532092 -0.160814 0.040534 0.360388 
 Kurtosis 2.613907 2.869852 2.811414 2.793174 2.601671 
      
 Jarque-Bera 2.082004 11.06323 28.96034 10.28102 141.2881 
 Probability 0.353101 0.003960 0.000001 0.005855 0.000000 
      
 Sum 93.94000 995.3200 20472.91 20526.50 20505.48 
 Sum Sq. Dev. 38.76340 185.5055 436.4743 166.2160 34.56818 
      
 Observations 22 231 5000 5000 5000 
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Table 14: Descriptive statistics for all-pooled strategies, time-weighted rates of return 
 Single Dual £25m £50m £100m 
 Mean 3.165349 3.458970 3.503354 3.522064 3.511593 
 Median 4.400000 3.980000 3.550113 3.532401 3.518134 
 Maximum 8.870000 8.370000 5.798345 5.435177 4.958509 
 Minimum -10.46000 -8.600000 0.406768 1.587408 1.594973 
 Std. Dev. 3.697506 2.219060 0.758747 0.568355 0.443456 
 Skewness -1.772325 -1.156145 -0.326596 -0.171558 -0.108074 
 Kurtosis 6.601502 5.154069 3.049450 2.810384 2.959573 
      
 Jarque-Bera 45.75087 375.7497 89.39684 32.01728 10.07386 
 Probability 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.006494 
      
 Sum 136.1100 3123.450 17516.77 17610.32 17557.97 
 Sum Sq. Dev. 574.2051 4441.654 2877.909 1614.812 983.0702 
      
 Observations 43 903 5000 5000 5000 
 
Table 15: Test for equality of mean 10 year TWRR, all-balanced multi-manager mandates 
Strategy  1 Multi-manager strategy 2 
Strategy 1 Strategy 2 Satterthwaite-Welch t-test 
Mean Std. dev #obs Mean Std. dev #obs t-stat Prob. 
Single fund £25m  4.27 1.36 22 4.09 0.30 5,000 0.0484 0.9616 
Single fund £50m  4.27 1.36 22 4.11 0.18 5,000 2.2727 0.0282 
Single fund £100m  4.27 1.36 22 4.10 0.08 5,000 3.5481 0.0010 
Dual fund £25m  4.31 0.90 231 4.09 0.30 5,000 -12.4239 0.0000 
Dual fund £50m  4.31 0.90 231 4.11 0.18 5,000 5.5805 0.0000 
Dual fund £100m  4.31 0.90 231 4.10 0.08 5,000 16.0245 0.0000 
£25m multi-manager £50m  4.09 0.30 5,000 4.11 0.18 5,000 -139.1751 0.0000 
£25m multi-manager £100m  4.09 0.30 5,000 4.10 0.08 5,000 -78.7988 0.0000 
£50m multi-manager £100m  4.11 0.18 5,000 4.10 0.08 5,000 -22.0022 0.0000 
 
Table 16: Test for equality of mean 10 year TWRR between all-pooled multi-manager mandates 
Strategy  1 Strategy 2 
Strategy 1 Strategy 2 Satterthwaite-Welch t-test 
Mean Std. dev #obs Mean 
Std. 
dev #obs t-stat Prob. 
Single fund £25m  3.17 3.70 43 3.50 0.76 5,000 -0.599336 0.5522 
Single fund £50m  3.17 3.70 43 3.52 0.57 5,000 -0.632561 0.5304 
Single fund £100m 3.17 3.70 43 3.51 0.44 5,000 -0.614018 0.5425 
Dual fund £25m  3.46 2.22 903 3.50 0.76 5,000 -0.594793 0.5521 
Dual fund £50m  3.46 2.22 903 3.52 0.57 5,000 -0.849384 0.3959 
Dual fund £100m  3.46 2.22 903 3.51 0.44 5,000 -0.710051 0.4779 
£25m  £50m  3.50 0.76 5,000 3.52 0.57 5,000 -1.395523 0.1629 
£25m  £100m  3.50 0.76 5,000 3.51 0.44 5,000 -0.662889 0.5074 
£50m  £100m  3.52 0.57 5,000 3.51 0.44 5,000 1.027066 0.3044 
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Figure 3: All-balanced funds 10 year time-weighted rate of return boxplots (%, pa) 
 
 
Figure 4: All-pooled funds 10 year time-weighted rate of return boxplots (%, pa) 
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6.  Conclusions and limitations 
 
This paper compares the risk and return characteristics of real estate investment strategies which employ 
varying formats of domestic real estate (direct exposure, balanced and specialist unlisted funds, a multi-
manager approach and listed securities) to deliver returns relative to a UK market index. Because there is 
an absence of relevant published literature, the particular aim of the research is to examine the case for the 
multi-manager solution to institutional real estate investment. Based on a random stochastic simulation of 
historic performance data from 2003 to 2012, we draw several conclusions which accord reasonably well 
with finance theory. 
 
Previous work suggests that the tracking error of direct real estate portfolios against a direct benchmark 
will be significant and will vary inversely with portfolio size, as we confirm.  This means that investors 
preferring to buy buildings will need to employ a lot of capital or accept significant risk relative to a market 
benchmark. As expected, we also confirm find that the tracking error of listed real estate portfolios against 
a direct benchmark have been very large (over 22%).  This means that while investors preferring to buy 
REITs and other listed real estate securities may not need to employ a lot of capital, they will be forced or 
accept enormous short-term risk relative to a direct market benchmark. 
 
We present our more original results as a justification for the clear support of three hypotheses based on 
finance theory.  As expected, we find that for smaller sums invested core unlisted funds will diversify away 
much of the specific risk held by direct portfolios, and that the greater the number of funds held in a 
portfolio the lower will be the tracking error against a direct property benchmark. However, we find that 
this only holds when fund selection is confined to balanced funds. In addition, increasing the number of 
funds held in a portfolio not only reduces the probability of an investor receiving a lower return but it also 
narrows the range of possible returns within each strategy providing greater levels of certainty for investors. 
We also find, as expected, that returns will fall as two sets of fees are incurred by investors following a 
multi-manager strategy. 
 
The paper suffers from several limitations, the major one being founded upon its nature as a controlled 
experiment rather than an empirical study. The results are therefore normative - demonstrating what ought 
to happen - rather than positive - demonstrating what did happen.  The reason we adopted this approach is 
due to a lack of availability of suitable empirical data.  The nature of a controlled experiment means that 
many precise limiting assumptions have to be made. While we have calibrated these limiting assumptions 
with the practice of a leading multi-manager they remain assumptions and there can be no guarantee that 
the real world will mimic the experiment.  For example, multi-managers may be  subject to business 
pressures which lead to a bias in fund selection which our study assumes away. 
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The study is also confined to one period of time which includes a severe financial crisis, and the results are 
for one country only.  In time, as more data become available, we would hope to see, and to be able to 
contribute to, empirical studies based on longer periods of time and covering several markets.  
To conclude, our analysis shows that for small sums invested (less than £100m) unlisted funds and in 
particular multi-manager approaches to real estate appear to offer a plausible solution to the search for 
direct real estate style returns with less risk (tracking error) against a direct real estate benchmark. Relative 
to a direct market benchmark, listed securities deliver the maximum risk caused by impossibly uncorrelated 
short term returns, while the minimum risk delivered by the multi-manager approach comes at the price of 
reduced returns.  As in most of applied finance, an efficient market operates and there is no free lunch.  
 
In this context; core direct real estate delivers a relatively high risk, high return strategy; and the multi-
manager solution delivers a lower risk for a reduced return. It is clear that multi-manager strategies were 
able to deliver returns that more effectively replicated a direct benchmark. However, multi-manager fees 
negatively impacted on returns and largely accounted for average under-performance of 0.15% against the 
direct benchmark. While it is estimated that over a 10year analysis period both direct and listed investment 
strategies out-performed multi-manager strategies (by 121 bps and 59bps per annum respectively). This 
out-performance would have been delivered at the cost of significant tracking error against direct property 
benchmarks. Specific risk can be avoided by real estate investors, but at a cost.  
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Appendix 1: capital market line analysis 
 
Our analysis shows that unlisted funds and in particular multi-manager approaches to real estate appear to 
offer a plausible solution to the search for direct real estate style returns with much less risk (tracking error) 
against a direct real estate benchmark. Relative to a direct market benchmark, listed securities deliver the 
maximum risk caused by impossibly uncorrelated short term returns, while the minimum risk delivered by 
the multi-manager approach comes at the price of reduced returns.  As in most of applied finance, an 
efficient market operates and there is no free lunch. In this context; core direct real estate delivers a relatively 
high risk, high return strategy; and the multi-manager solution delivers a lower risk for a reduced return.  
 
In this appendix we examine these findings in more detail. 
 
Table A1 shows the risk-return results and the coefficient of variation (return dived by risk) and Figure A1 
shows the capital market line for £25m invested, plotting the risk and return for the direct solution against 
a single fund randomly selected, two funds randomly selected, and a multi-manager solution, all confined 
to the all balanced universe, plus the listed portfolio.  
 
Table A1: Risk and return, £25m invested, all balanced universe 
 Return Risk CV 
Direct 5.31 7.59 0.70 
One fund 4.27 3.77 1.13 
Two funds 4.31 3.07 1.40 
Multi-manager 4.09 2.12 1.93 
Listed 4.69 22.43 0.21  
Figure A1:  Risk and return, £25m invested, all balanced universe 
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These results show risk-return combinations in line with expectations, with the coefficient of variation 
rising above the direct solution as more funds are added, with the exception of the listed approach, which 
offers more risk for less return than the direct solution, and the two fund approach which offers marginally 
more return than the single fund approach for less risk. Otherwise, funds offer less return for less risk and 
the multi-manager solution appears especially efficient as measured by the coefficient of variation. 
 
Table A2 shows the risk-return results and the coefficient of variation and Figure A2 shows the capital 
market line for £50m invested, plotting the risk and return for the direct solution against a single fund 
randomly selected, two funds randomly selected, and a multi-manager solution, all confined to the all 
balanced universe, plus the listed portfolio.      
 Table A2: Risk and return, £50m invested, all balanced universe 
 Return Risk CV 
Direct 5.31 5.35 0.99 
One fund 4.27 3.77 1.13 
Two funds 4.31 3.07 1.40 
Multi-manager 4.09 2.01 2.04 
Listed 4.69 22.43 0.21  
Figure A2:  Risk and return, £50m invested, all balanced universe 
 
 
These results again risk-return combinations in line with expectations, with the coefficient of variation rising 
above the direct solution as more funds are added, with the exception of the listed approach, which offers 
more risk for less return than the direct solution, and the two fund approach which offers marginally more 
return than the single fund approach for less risk. Otherwise, funds offer less return for less risk and the 
multi-manager solution appears especially efficient as measured by the coefficient of variation. 
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Table A3 shows the risk-return results and the coefficient of variation (return divided by risk) and Figure 
A3 shows the capital market line for £100m invested, plotting the risk and return for the direct solution 
against a single fund randomly selected, two funds randomly selected, and a multi-manager solution, all 
confined to the all balanced universe, plus the listed portfolio.      
 Table A3: Risk and return, £100m invested, all balanced universe 
 Return Risk CV 
Direct 5.31 4.06 1.31 
One fund 4.27 3.77 1.13 
Two funds 4.31 3.07 1.40 
Multi-manager 4.10 1.95 2.10 
Listed 4.69 22.43 0.21  
Figure A3:  Risk and return, £100m invested, all balanced universe 
 
 
These results are less clear. £100m invested allows a direct approach to diversify some risk away, and while 
risk falls as more funds are added the cost in return loss appears greater, The listed approach offers more 
risk for less return than the direct solution, and the two fund approach offers marginally more return than 
the single fund approach for less risk. Otherwise, funds offer less return for less risk and the multi-manager 
solution appears especially efficient as measured by the coefficient of variation. 
 
Table A4 shows the risk-return results and the coefficient of variation and Figure A4 shows the capital 
market line for £25m invested, plotting the risk and return for the direct solution against a single fund 
randomly selected, two funds randomly selected, and a multi-manager solution, all accessing the all 
pooled universe, plus the listed portfolio.      
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Table A4: Risk and return, £25m invested, all pooled universe 
 Return Risk CV 
Direct 5.31 7.59 0.70 
One fund 4.27 3.77 1.13 
Two funds 4.31 3.07 1.40 
Multi-manager 3.50 3.63 0.96 
Listed 4.69 22.43 0.21  
Figure A4:  Risk and return, £25m invested, all pooled universe 
 
 
Using the all-pooled fund universe damages the fund approach by introducing more risk and these results 
are less clear than those shown by Table 1 and Figure 1. £25m invested means a direct approach suffers 
from high risk, but risk no longer falls as more funds are added. The multi-manager solution is no longer 
efficient and the random selection of two funds would have been better.  
 
Table A5 shows the risk-return results and the coefficient of variation and Figure A5 shows the capital 
market line for £50m invested, plotting the risk and return for the direct solution against a single fund 
randomly selected, two funds randomly selected, and a multi-manager solution, all accessing the all 
pooled universe, plus the listed portfolio.      
 
Table A5: Risk and return, £50m invested, all pooled universe 
 Return Risk CV 
Direct 5.31 5.35 0.99 
One fund 4.27 3.77 1.13 
Two funds 4.31 3.07 1.40 
Multi-manager 3.54 3.33 1.06 
Listed 4.69 22.43 0.21  
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Figure A5:  Risk and return, £50m invested, all pooled universe 
 
 
Again, using the all-pooled fund universe damages the fund approach by introducing more risk. For £50m 
invested a direct approach continues to suffer from high risk. However, risk does not fall as more funds 
are added, the multi-manager solution is no longer efficient and the random selection of two funds would 
have been better.   
 
Table A6 shows the risk-return results and the coefficient of variation and FigureA6 shows the capital 
market line for £100m invested, plotting the risk and return for the direct solution against a single fund 
randomly selected, two funds randomly selected, and a multi-manager solution, all accessing the all 
pooled universe, plus the listed portfolio.      
 
Table A6: Risk and return, £100m invested, all pooled universe 
 Return Risk CV 
Direct 5.31 4.06 1.31 
One fund 4.27 3.77 1.13 
Two funds 4.31 3.07 1.40 
Multi-manager 3.51 3.19 1.10 
Listed 4.69 22.43 0.21  
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Figure A6:  Risk and return, £100m invested, all pooled universe 
 
 
Again, using the all-pooled fund universe damages the fund approach by introducing more risk. For £100m 
invested a direct approach only marginally more risk and offers considerable more return. The random 
selection of two funds would have reduced risk by one percentage point at the cost of a similar fall in return, 
while a multi-manager approach would have delivered returns of nearly two percentage points less for a 
risk reduction of less than one point. 
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Appendix 2: re-sampling statistics 
 
Table A7 presents the confidence intervals for the multi-manager mean TWRR and tracking errors 
estimated from the bootstrap re-sampling.  
 
Table A7: Multi-manager strategy bootstrap re-sampling 99% confidence intervals 
Universe Strategy 
TWRR Tracking error 
Lower 
bound 
(0.5%) 
Mean 
(see table 
1) 
Upper 
bound 
(99.5%) 
Lower 
bound 
(0.5%) 
Mean 
(see table 
1) 
Upper 
bound 
(99.5%) 
Unlisted All 
Balanced 
Property Fund 
Universe 
£25m multi-manager 4.08 4.09 4.10 2.11 2.12 2.13 
£50m multi-manager 4.10 4.11 4.11 2.00 2.01 2.01 
£100m multi-manager 4.098 4.10 4.104 1.950 1.95 1.954 
Unlisted All-
pooled Property 
Fund Universe 
£25m multi-manager 3.47 3.50 3.53 3.58 3.63 3.67 
£50m multi-manager 3.50 3.54 3.54 3.30 3.33 3.37 
£100m multi-manager 3.50 3.51 3.53 3.16 3.19 3.21 
 
